Scope: Unit 1 (Foundations of American Democracy) and Unit 2 (Interactions Among Branches of Government) only. Nothing from civil liberties/civil rights, ideologies, or participation (those come after Lesson 13).
This is a timed mid-course diagnostic. It is half the length of the full AP exam and covers only the material you have studied so far.
Approximate weighting for this diagnostic: Section I = 50%, Section II = 50% (see the score-band note at the end — clearly labeled approximate).
Do not look at the Answer Key & Scoring section until you have finished. Good luck.
28 questions · 40 minutes
1. B — For Locke, government exists to protect natural rights (life, liberty, property); the Declaration echoes this. (A/C/D describe purposes Locke rejected or did not center.)
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights... That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." — Declaration of Independence (1776)
The bolded phrase most directly expresses which democratic ideal?
2. C — "Consent of the governed" means legitimate authority flows from the people = popular sovereignty. (Separation of powers, judicial review, and federalism are structural, not the source of authority.)
3. B — Under the Articles the national government could not tax or regulate interstate commerce, leaving it financially and economically powerless. (A/C/D are the opposite of the Articles' actual design.)
4. A — Shays' Rebellion exposed the national government's inability to keep order and pushed leaders toward the Constitutional Convention. (It did not overthrow the state, nor produce the Bill of Rights, nor validate the Articles.)
5. B — The Great Compromise created a bicameral Congress: population-based House, equal-state Senate. (A is the Three-Fifths Compromise; C describes the Articles; D is inaccurate.)
6. C — The Three-Fifths Compromise counted three-fifths of the enslaved population for both representation and direct taxation. (The other options are unrelated convention disputes.)
"Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency." — Federalist No. 10
In Federalist No. 10, Madison argues that the best way to control the effects of faction is to
7. C — Madison's cure for faction is a large (extended) republic where many factions check one another, not abolishing liberty (which he explicitly rejects in the excerpt). (B describes what Madison warns against; D is anachronistic.)
8. B — Brutus No. 1 argues a free republic must be small; a large, diverse one will threaten liberty and fail to represent the people. (A is a Federalist argument; C/D contradict the Anti-Federalist position.)
9. B — "Ambition must counteract ambition" is the logic of separated powers with checks and balances. (The other clauses/compromises do not embody that mechanism.)
10. B — Article V: proposal by two-thirds of both houses or a convention called by two-thirds of the states. (A/C/D are not valid proposal routes.)
11. C — The Necessary and Proper (Elastic) Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 18, is the textual source of implied powers. (Commerce is a specific enumerated power; Supremacy resolves conflicts; the Tenth Amendment protects state powers.)
12. A — The Court upheld the bank as an implied power (Necessary and Proper) and barred Maryland's tax under the Supremacy Clause. (B/C/D state the opposite of the holding.)
Federal Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Governments (selected years)
| Year | Federal grants ($ billions) | Grants as % of state & local revenue |
|---|---|---|
| 1980 | 91 | 26% |
| 1995 | 225 | 22% |
| 2010 | 608 | 27% |
| 2020 | 721 | 31% |
Which conclusion is best supported by the table?
13. B — Grants rose from $91B (1980) to $721B (2020), and the revenue share rose from 26% to 31%. (A/D contradict the numbers; C is unsupported.)
14. B — Block grants fund a broad policy area with wide state discretion. (A describes a categorical grant; C describes an unfunded mandate; D describes a direct command/preemption.)
15. C — Striking a federal law because non-economic, purely local activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce mirrors United States v. Lopez. (Marbury = judicial review; McCulloch expanded federal power; Baker = redistricting.)
16. A — Article I, Section 8 enumerates Congress's powers, including coining money, declaring war, and interstate commerce. (Art. II §2 = presidential powers; Art. III = judiciary; 10th = reserved powers.)
17. C — The Senate allows the filibuster (extended debate); the House limits debate via the Rules Committee. (A reverses the origination clause — revenue bills start in the House; B swaps the chamber sizes; D is false — the Senate ratifies treaties.)
18. B — Cloture, requiring 60 votes, ends a filibuster. (A/C/D are not the mechanism.)
Picture a congressional district drawn as a thin, serpentine ribbon that winds for more than 150 miles along an interstate highway — at some points no wider than the road itself — stitching together several distant urban neighborhoods that share the same racial composition while carefully excluding the suburbs in between.
A voter challenging this district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander would rely most directly on the principle established in
19. B — A bizarrely shaped, race-based district triggers strict scrutiny under Shaw v. Reno. (McCulloch/Marbury/Lopez concern federal power and judicial review, not districting.)
20. B — Baker v. Carr held redistricting challenges justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, opening federal courts to them. (A is Rucho; C overstates; D contradicts one person, one vote.)
21. B — Voting one's own judgment about the national interest is the trustee model. (Delegate = mirror constituents; partisan = follow party; lobbyist is not a legislator.)
22. C — Executive orders are an informal/implied power (not spelled out in the Constitution). (Veto, judicial nominations, and treaty-signing are formal, enumerated powers.)
23. B — Federalist No. 70 defends a single, energetic executive ("decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch"). (A is the opposite; C/D misstate Hamilton's argument.)
24. B — A veto override requires a two-thirds vote in both chambers. (A/C/D state incorrect thresholds.)
25. B — An iron triangle links a congressional committee, an agency, and an interest group. (The other options describe branches or levels of government, not the iron-triangle actors.)
26. C — Judicial review was established in practice by Marbury v. Madison; it is not in Article III's text and is only argued for in Federalist No. 78. (McCulloch assumed, but did not establish, review.)
"The judiciary... may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." — Federalist No. 78
This passage most directly supports the conclusion that
27. B — "Neither force nor will... depend upon the aid of the executive arm" means courts rely on the executive to enforce rulings. (A/C/D contradict Hamilton's point about a weak, independent judiciary.)
28. B — Both are John Marshall opinions interpreting the Constitution and defining governmental power. (A is false for McCulloch, which upheld the bank and struck a state tax; C is false — McCulloch expanded national power; D is unrelated.)
MCQ answer line: 1-B, 2-C, 3-B, 4-A, 5-B, 6-C, 7-C, 8-B, 9-B, 10-B, 11-C, 12-A, 13-B, 14-B, 15-C, 16-A, 17-C, 18-B, 19-B, 20-B, 21-B, 22-C, 23-B, 24-B, 25-B, 26-C, 27-B, 28-B.
2 questions · 50 minutes (~25 minutes each)
Read the scenario, then respond to parts (A), (B), and (C).
The Clean Waterways Act passes both chambers of Congress by a simple majority. The president vetoes the bill, objecting that its costs should fall to the states and that it stretches federal authority too far. Congress responds by overriding the veto, and the Act becomes law. The law directs a federal executive agency to write and enforce the detailed pollution rules that will make the Act operate. Months later, the agency has still not issued the required rules, and its leadership signals that enforcement is a low priority. Meanwhile, several states file suit in federal court, arguing that the Act reaches activity that is beyond the national government's constitutional power.
(A) Describe the constitutional power that Congress used to enact the Clean Waterways Act over the president's veto.
(B) In the context of the scenario, explain how a federal executive agency's use of discretion in the rulemaking/implementation process can affect whether a law like the Clean Waterways Act achieves its goals.
(C) In the context of the scenario, explain how the federal courts could respond to the states' constitutional challenge to the Act.
Read the description of the non-required case, then respond to parts (A), (B), and (C).
Non-required case — Rucho v. Common Cause (2019). Voters in North Carolina and Maryland challenged congressional district maps that, they argued, had been deliberately drawn by the party in power to maximize its own seats and disadvantage the opposing party — that is, extreme partisan gerrymandering. They asked the federal courts to declare the maps unconstitutional. In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that claims of partisan gerrymandering present a nonjusticiable political question — there is no clear, manageable legal standard for federal courts to apply — and so the federal courts may not decide them. Such disputes, the Court said, must be addressed by other actors, such as state governments and Congress.
The required case for this comparison is Baker v. Carr (1962), in which the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the unequal population of legislative districts (malapportionment) is justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so federal courts may hear it — a ruling that opened the door to the "one person, one vote" principle.
(A) Identify the constitutional provision that is common to both Baker v. Carr (1962) and Rucho v. Common Cause (2019).
(B) Based on the constitutional provision identified in part (A), explain how the facts of Rucho v. Common Cause led to a holding that differs from the holding in Baker v. Carr.
(C) Describe an action that a level or branch of government other than the federal courts could take in response to the Rucho decision to address partisan gerrymandering.
1. B — For Locke, government exists to protect natural rights (life, liberty, property); the Declaration echoes this. (A/C/D describe purposes Locke rejected or did not center.)
2. C — "Consent of the governed" means legitimate authority flows from the people = popular sovereignty. (Separation of powers, judicial review, and federalism are structural, not the source of authority.)
3. B — Under the Articles the national government could not tax or regulate interstate commerce, leaving it financially and economically powerless. (A/C/D are the opposite of the Articles' actual design.)
4. A — Shays' Rebellion exposed the national government's inability to keep order and pushed leaders toward the Constitutional Convention. (It did not overthrow the state, nor produce the Bill of Rights, nor validate the Articles.)
5. B — The Great Compromise created a bicameral Congress: population-based House, equal-state Senate. (A is the Three-Fifths Compromise; C describes the Articles; D is inaccurate.)
6. C — The Three-Fifths Compromise counted three-fifths of the enslaved population for both representation and direct taxation. (The other options are unrelated convention disputes.)
7. C — Madison's cure for faction is a large (extended) republic where many factions check one another, not abolishing liberty (which he explicitly rejects in the excerpt). (B describes what Madison warns against; D is anachronistic.)
8. B — Brutus No. 1 argues a free republic must be small; a large, diverse one will threaten liberty and fail to represent the people. (A is a Federalist argument; C/D contradict the Anti-Federalist position.)
9. B — "Ambition must counteract ambition" is the logic of separated powers with checks and balances. (The other clauses/compromises do not embody that mechanism.)
10. B — Article V: proposal by two-thirds of both houses or a convention called by two-thirds of the states. (A/C/D are not valid proposal routes.)
11. C — The Necessary and Proper (Elastic) Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 18, is the textual source of implied powers. (Commerce is a specific enumerated power; Supremacy resolves conflicts; the Tenth Amendment protects state powers.)
12. A — The Court upheld the bank as an implied power (Necessary and Proper) and barred Maryland's tax under the Supremacy Clause. (B/C/D state the opposite of the holding.)
13. B — Grants rose from $91B (1980) to $721B (2020), and the revenue share rose from 26% to 31%. (A/D contradict the numbers; C is unsupported.)
14. B — Block grants fund a broad policy area with wide state discretion. (A describes a categorical grant; C describes an unfunded mandate; D describes a direct command/preemption.)
15. C — Striking a federal law because non-economic, purely local activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce mirrors United States v. Lopez. (Marbury = judicial review; McCulloch expanded federal power; Baker = redistricting.)
16. A — Article I, Section 8 enumerates Congress's powers, including coining money, declaring war, and interstate commerce. (Art. II §2 = presidential powers; Art. III = judiciary; 10th = reserved powers.)
17. C — The Senate allows the filibuster (extended debate); the House limits debate via the Rules Committee. (A reverses the origination clause — revenue bills start in the House; B swaps the chamber sizes; D is false — the Senate ratifies treaties.)
18. B — Cloture, requiring 60 votes, ends a filibuster. (A/C/D are not the mechanism.)
19. B — A bizarrely shaped, race-based district triggers strict scrutiny under Shaw v. Reno. (McCulloch/Marbury/Lopez concern federal power and judicial review, not districting.)
20. B — Baker v. Carr held redistricting challenges justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, opening federal courts to them. (A is Rucho; C overstates; D contradicts one person, one vote.)
21. B — Voting one's own judgment about the national interest is the trustee model. (Delegate = mirror constituents; partisan = follow party; lobbyist is not a legislator.)
22. C — Executive orders are an informal/implied power (not spelled out in the Constitution). (Veto, judicial nominations, and treaty-signing are formal, enumerated powers.)
23. B — Federalist No. 70 defends a single, energetic executive ("decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch"). (A is the opposite; C/D misstate Hamilton's argument.)
24. B — A veto override requires a two-thirds vote in both chambers. (A/C/D state incorrect thresholds.)
25. B — An iron triangle links a congressional committee, an agency, and an interest group. (The other options describe branches or levels of government, not the iron-triangle actors.)
26. C — Judicial review was established in practice by Marbury v. Madison; it is not in Article III's text and is only argued for in Federalist No. 78. (McCulloch assumed, but did not establish, review.)
27. B — "Neither force nor will... depend upon the aid of the executive arm" means courts rely on the executive to enforce rulings. (A/C/D contradict Hamilton's point about a weak, independent judiciary.)
28. B — Both are John Marshall opinions interpreting the Constitution and defining governmental power. (A is false for McCulloch, which upheld the bank and struck a state tax; C is false — McCulloch expanded national power; D is unrelated.)
MCQ answer line: 1-B, 2-C, 3-B, 4-A, 5-B, 6-C, 7-C, 8-B, 9-B, 10-B, 11-C, 12-A, 13-B, 14-B, 15-C, 16-A, 17-C, 18-B, 19-B, 20-B, 21-B, 22-C, 23-B, 24-B, 25-B, 26-C, 27-B, 28-B.
(A) — 1 point. The veto override power. Congress enacted the law over the president's objection by using its veto override power under Article I, Section 7: when the president vetoes a bill, Congress can still make it law by re-passing it with a two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate. This is a legislative check on the executive's veto, so the Clean Waterways Act became law despite the president's opposition.
(B) — 1 point. Bureaucratic discretion in rulemaking/implementation. Congress wrote the Act in general terms and delegated the details to a federal agency, which must issue rules to carry it out. Because the agency has discretionary authority over how — and how vigorously — to write and enforce those rules, it can shape the law's real-world effect. In the scenario, the agency's delay in issuing rules and its signal that enforcement is a low priority mean the Act may accomplish little in practice, even though it is on the books. Bureaucratic implementation can therefore strengthen, weaken, or effectively stall a law that Congress has passed.
(C) — 1 point. Judicial response to the states' challenge. The federal courts could exercise judicial review (established in Marbury v. Madison) over the states' claim. A court would compare the Act to the Constitution — for example, asking whether the regulated activity falls within Congress's Commerce Clause power. The court could uphold the Act as a valid exercise of federal power, or it could strike it down (in whole or part) as exceeding Congress's constitutional authority, as the Court did with a federal law in United States v. Lopez. Either way, the judiciary decides whether the Act is constitutional.
Total: 3 points.
Common point-loss (FRQ A): - (A): Writing only "Congress passed a law" or "Congress used checks and balances" without naming the two-thirds override. Also, do not confuse the override (a check on the veto) with an ordinary vote. - (B): Describing what the agency did ("it delayed") without explaining the concept — that discretion in rulemaking/implementation determines whether the law's goals are met. Process over outcome earns the point. - (C): Naming a response by the wrong actor (e.g., "Congress could amend it") when the part specifically asks about the federal courts. Vague answers like "the courts decide" without invoking judicial review / a constitutionality determination may not earn credit.
(A) — 1 point. Common constitutional provision. Both cases involve the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In each, voters argued that the way legislative districts were drawn treated their votes unequally and thus denied them equal protection of the laws.
(B) — 1 point. How the facts produced a different holding. In Baker v. Carr, the problem was malapportionment — districts contained wildly unequal populations, so some voters' ballots counted far more than others'. The Court found this kind of vote-dilution claim was one federal courts could measure under the Equal Protection Clause, so it held the issue justiciable and allowed courts to hear it (opening the door to "one person, one vote"). In Rucho v. Common Cause, the claim was partisan gerrymandering — that maps were drawn to advantage one political party. The Court concluded there was no clear, manageable legal standard for judging how much partisanship is "too much," so it held such claims to be a nonjusticiable political question that federal courts may not decide. The difference in facts — measurable population inequality in Baker versus a partisan-fairness claim with no judicial yardstick in Rucho — led to opposite holdings on whether federal courts can act.
(C) — 1 point. Response by another level/branch. Because Rucho closes the federal courthouse door to partisan-gerrymandering claims, other actors must respond. For example, a state could adopt an independent (nonpartisan) redistricting commission to draw district lines instead of the state legislature, or amend its state constitution and rely on its state courts to enforce fairness standards. (Alternative valid answers: Congress could pass legislation setting national redistricting standards under its Article I, §4 power over the "Times, Places and Manner" of congressional elections; or the U.S. Constitution could be amended.)
Total: 3 points.
Common point-loss (FRQ B): - (A): Naming the wrong provision (e.g., the First Amendment or the Commerce Clause). The shared, exam-credited provision here is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Article I" alone is not enough. - (B): Describing each case separately without explaining the difference — you must tie it to justiciability: Baker = justiciable (a measurable equal-protection claim), Rucho = nonjusticiable political question (no manageable standard). Merely retelling the facts loses the point. - (C): Suggesting an action by the federal courts (the part explicitly asks for a different level/branch), or giving a non-governmental answer ("voters could protest"). Name a concrete governmental mechanism: independent commission, state courts/constitution, or congressional legislation.
This diagnostic is not an official College Board scale. Because Mock Exam 1 covers only Units 1–2, treat the bands below as a rough, approximate self-check, not a predicted AP score. Weight Section I = 50% and Section II = 50% (each FRQ is worth 3 points, 6 points total).
Convert each section to a percent, then average: - Section I % = (MC correct ÷ 28) × 100 - Section II % = (FRQ points earned ÷ 6) × 100 - Composite % = (Section I % + Section II %) ÷ 2
| Composite % | Approximate band | What it suggests |
|---|---|---|
| 80–100% | Strong (≈ AP 4–5 range) | Units 1–2 are solid; keep this pace into Unit 3. |
| 65–79% | Proficient (≈ AP 3–4 range) | Good grasp; tighten SCOTUS holdings and FRQ explanation (not just description). |
| 50–64% | Developing (≈ AP 2–3 range) | Re-drill the required cases (Marbury, McCulloch, Lopez, Baker, Shaw) and the clauses. |
| Below 50% | Beginning | Revisit Lessons 1–13 before moving on; focus on document IDs and case holdings. |
Reminder: FRQ points reward the constitutional mechanism and explanation, not a retelling of the scenario. On the real exam, Section II is scored against the official College Board rubric for your exam year.
GovIQ · Mock Exam 1 of 2 · Mid-Course Diagnostic (Units 1–2, Lessons 1–13)
This is exam-preparation material and is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by the College Board, which produces the AP® US Government and Politics exam. AP® is a registered trademark of the College Board. Foundational-document and Supreme Court opinion quotations are drawn from public-domain texts.
Content pending external review (government/poli-sci reviewer).
Your running multiple-choice score appears in the bar below. Self-score the free-response section with the rubrics in the answer key, then use the diagnostic table to target review.