Article III of the Constitution creates "one supreme Court" and lets Congress "ordain and establish" lower courts — and that is nearly the whole design. It sets no fixed number of justices and, crucially, never mentions the power that defines the Court today. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78 (1788), called the judiciary the "least dangerous" branch: the executive holds the "sword" (force), the legislature holds the "purse" (money), and the judiciary holds "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." Because it is structurally weak, Hamilton argued, it must be independent — which the Constitution secures through life tenure ("good Behaviour") and salaries that cannot be reduced.
| Level | Role | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. District Courts (94) | Trial courts — witnesses, evidence, juries | Original — hear a case first |
| U.S. Courts of Appeals (13 circuits) | Review the legal decisions of district courts for error | Appellate — review a case already decided |
| U.S. Supreme Court | Final word on federal and constitutional questions | Mostly appellate; narrow original jurisdiction fixed by Article III |
Original vs. appellate jurisdiction is a classic exam point. Original means a court hears a case for the first time; appellate means it reviews a case decided below. The Supreme Court is overwhelmingly appellate. It chooses its own docket: a losing party petitions for a writ of certiorari, and the Court grants it under the rule of four — if at least four of the nine justices agree to hear the case. Of roughly 7,000 petitions a year, the Court grants only about 60 to 70.
Judicial review — the power of courts to strike down laws and executive actions that violate the Constitution — is not written in the Constitution. It was established in Marbury v. Madison (1803). Chief Justice John Marshall held that a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with Article III and was therefore void — the first time the Court voided an act of Congress. His principle: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." The weakest branch thereby claimed the authority to measure the acts of the other two against the Constitution.
A decided case becomes a precedent, and stare decisis ("to stand by things decided") holds that courts should generally follow precedent — but not always: Brown v. Board of Education overruled Plessy, and Dobbs overruled Roe. Two philosophies describe how broadly judges use their power. Judicial activism is a willingness to strike down laws and overturn precedent; judicial restraint is deference to the elected branches and to precedent. These describe an approach to power, not a political party — activist and restrained opinions come from both ends of the spectrum.
Because the Court has no sword and no purse, the other branches hold real leverage: judges are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate (advice and consent); Congress and the states can amend the Constitution to overturn a ruling; Congress controls the Court's appellate jurisdiction; and the Court depends on the executive to enforce its decisions.
[GRAPH: A funnel/pyramid. Wide top labeled "~7,000 cert petitions per year" narrows through a middle band "granted under the rule of four (4 of 9 justices)" down to a narrow tip "~60-70 cases decided with full opinion (under 1%)," illustrating the Court's tight control over its own docket.]
1. C. Judicial review is the power to void unconstitutional government action. A is the precedent doctrine; B is a confirmation custom; D is a type of jurisdiction; E is a claim of executive confidentiality. Fix rule: striking down a law as unconstitutional = judicial review.
2. D. Marbury v. Madison (1803) established judicial review in practice. A only argued for it; B is the text that omits it; C was the statute struck down; E is a recent, unrelated case. Fix rule: "Where did judicial review come from?" → Marbury, not Article III.
3. A. The rule of four requires four of the nine justices. B through E overstate the threshold; note that four is a minority, not a majority. Fix rule: rule of four = four votes to grant cert.
4. E. District courts are trial courts with original jurisdiction. A describes the Supreme Court; B describes appeals courts; C is a sliver of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction; D is the Supreme Court's certiorari power. Fix rule: trial court = original jurisdiction; appeals court = appellate.
5. C. Ending Chevron shifted interpretation of ambiguous statutes from agencies to courts. A and B overstate the ruling; D is unrelated; E confuses Loper Bright with Dobbs. Fix rule: Loper Bright = courts, not agencies, read ambiguous laws.
6. B. Willingness to strike laws and overturn precedent is judicial activism. A is its opposite; C is a confirmation custom; D is the precedent doctrine; E is a type of jurisdiction. Fix rule: strike + overturn = activism; defer = restraint.
7. A. Activism and restraint describe an approach to power, not partisanship. B wrongly equates them with ideology; C misdefines restraint; D and E are false. Fix rule: activism/restraint ≠ liberal/conservative.
8. E. Dobbs returned abortion regulation to the states. A and B are the two opposite misreadings; C invents a mandate; D wrongly assigns the issue to agencies. Fix rule: Dobbs removed the federal rule and sent the question to the states.
9. D. Life tenure means one confirmation can shape the law for decades, raising the stakes. A and B describe the other branches; C and E invent terms and elections the Constitution does not give judges. Fix rule: life tenure = high-stakes confirmations.
10. D. The "least dangerous" argument rests on the Court holding neither sword nor purse and depending on the executive to enforce rulings. A is false (judges are unelected); B describes other branches; C overstates and ignores limits; E invents a power. Fix rule: Federalist No. 78 = weakest branch, needs independence.
11. B. A ruling means nothing if the executive refuses to enforce it — Hamilton's central vulnerability. A, C, D, and E are normal, non-threatening events; E actually strengthens the ruling. Fix rule: the courts depend on executive enforcement.
12. C. Trump v. United States recognized immunity for official acts (absolute for core powers, presumptive otherwise) but none for unofficial acts. A and B are the two extremes the Court rejected; D and E invent consequences. Fix rule: immunity for official acts only, not unofficial ones.
1. C. Judicial review is the power to void unconstitutional government action. A is the precedent doctrine; B is a confirmation custom; D is a type of jurisdiction; E is a claim of executive confidentiality. Fix rule: striking down a law as unconstitutional = judicial review.
2. D. Marbury v. Madison (1803) established judicial review in practice. A only argued for it; B is the text that omits it; C was the statute struck down; E is a recent, unrelated case. Fix rule: "Where did judicial review come from?" → Marbury, not Article III.
3. A. The rule of four requires four of the nine justices. B through E overstate the threshold; note that four is a minority, not a majority. Fix rule: rule of four = four votes to grant cert.
4. E. District courts are trial courts with original jurisdiction. A describes the Supreme Court; B describes appeals courts; C is a sliver of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction; D is the Supreme Court's certiorari power. Fix rule: trial court = original jurisdiction; appeals court = appellate.
5. C. Ending Chevron shifted interpretation of ambiguous statutes from agencies to courts. A and B overstate the ruling; D is unrelated; E confuses Loper Bright with Dobbs. Fix rule: Loper Bright = courts, not agencies, read ambiguous laws.
6. B. Willingness to strike laws and overturn precedent is judicial activism. A is its opposite; C is a confirmation custom; D is the precedent doctrine; E is a type of jurisdiction. Fix rule: strike + overturn = activism; defer = restraint.
7. A. Activism and restraint describe an approach to power, not partisanship. B wrongly equates them with ideology; C misdefines restraint; D and E are false. Fix rule: activism/restraint ≠ liberal/conservative.
8. E. Dobbs returned abortion regulation to the states. A and B are the two opposite misreadings; C invents a mandate; D wrongly assigns the issue to agencies. Fix rule: Dobbs removed the federal rule and sent the question to the states.
9. D. Life tenure means one confirmation can shape the law for decades, raising the stakes. A and B describe the other branches; C and E invent terms and elections the Constitution does not give judges. Fix rule: life tenure = high-stakes confirmations.
10. D. The "least dangerous" argument rests on the Court holding neither sword nor purse and depending on the executive to enforce rulings. A is false (judges are unelected); B describes other branches; C overstates and ignores limits; E invents a power. Fix rule: Federalist No. 78 = weakest branch, needs independence.
11. B. A ruling means nothing if the executive refuses to enforce it — Hamilton's central vulnerability. A, C, D, and E are normal, non-threatening events; E actually strengthens the ruling. Fix rule: the courts depend on executive enforcement.
12. C. Trump v. United States recognized immunity for official acts (absolute for core powers, presumptive otherwise) but none for unofficial acts. A and B are the two extremes the Court rejected; D and E invent consequences. Fix rule: immunity for official acts only, not unofficial ones.